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ABSTRACT 
What happens when some of the traditional questions and concerns of the philosophy of science are 
brought to the non-traditional field of synthetic biology? Given that synthetic biology is a very 
diverse field, this might serve to highlight the many ways in which it is business as usual. However, 
prominent concepts and research practices of synthetic biology can be seen to confound established 
ideas of how knowledge is produced and validated in the sciences. By highlighting and readying for 
discussion the tension between alternative images of knowledge production in synthetic biology, 
this paper seeks to open up debate among philosophers of science, and within the diverse 
community of synthetic biologists. With the advance of emerging technosciences like synthetic 
biology what is at stake is not primarily how they might or might not change the world. At stake, 
first of all, are epistemic values, the ethos and authority of science, and the relation of knowledge 
and power.  Building on ongoing discussions, the paper begins by exhibiting contested notions of 
understanding, rational engineering, and design. In a second step, it turns to different conceptions of 
biological “systems” by presenting divergent accounts of the origin of synthetic biology and of how 
systems biology gave rise to synthetic biology. Finally, it seeks to focus the debate on a definition of 
synthetic biology, according to which it builds, for constructive purposes, on achievements of 
technical control of biological complexity, that is, that it uses these achievements to generate, rather 
than reduce, complexity. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As in many so-called technosciences, some of the research practices and epistemic ideals of 
synthetic biology confound traditional conceptions of scientific method, regarding questions such as 
“how is knowledge generated and validated,” “what does it mean to understand or explain 
something,” “how important is the development of new theories,” or “what is the difference 
between explorative experimentation and experimental hypothesis testing?” Indeed, on some 
accounts of what synthetic biology is and how it works, it does not even appear to be interested in 
traditional scientific methods of reducing complexity by intellectual means. Instead, it promotes the 
controlled generation of complexity by technical means, that is, by drawing available theories and 
tools into a technoscientific design process.‑    1
 By inquiring how synthetic biology agrees with or confounds established notions of science,     
philosophers of science and of technoscience‑  contribute to a much larger process of delineating 2
what synthetic biology is in comparison to other fields of biological research such as molecular 
biology, bioinformatics, systems biology, or genetic engineering. This is not a matter of 
classification or definition but of characterization: what are the basic assumptions, what are the 
routines and laboratory practices, what are the promises and ambitions, what is the special mind-set 
of synthetic biology? To the extent that it speaks with a distinctive voice at all, how does synthetic 
biology set itself apart from other endeavors? Given the fairly recent emergence of synthetic 
biology, there is already an impressive body of philosophical literature that adresses these questions 
(e.g., Bensaude Vincent 2013a and 2013b, Delgado/Porcar 2013, Gelfert 2013, Gramelsberger 
2013, Kastenhofer 2013a and 2013b, Knuutila/Loettgers 2013, O’Malley 2009 and 2011, Schmidt 
this volume, Schyfter 2013). 
 Here and throughout, the default meaning of “complexity” is simply that a structure or system is “not simple” or 1
“difficult to conceive as a sum of simple processes” or “complicated.”  Science and classical theories of knowledge 
conceive the task of the human intellect as making sense of a bewildering multitude of sensory impressions by isolating 
from them simple patterns or lawful causal relations. This “reduction of complexity” is considered a major achievement 
of the mind. Accordingly, the first “limit of complexity” arises when things get to be too complicated to be tractable by 
the human mind (though a computer might still be able to achieve predictive control or to isolate strict causal 
dependencies).  In contrast, the challenge of synthetic biology is seen as building up or generating complexity (the first 
sessions at the 2013 SynBio 6.0 conference were dedicated to the question of “realizing biological complexity,” see the 
program under http://sb6.biobricks.org/, accessed January 5, 2014; also Mast/Möller/Braun 2013).  Only at two points 
in the following discussion (see notes 10 and 16 below), does “complexity” assume a more exalted systems-theoretic 
status, thereby explicitly becoming a theoretical term. In the theoretical context of systems thinking, there is as second 
limit of complexity, namely irreducibility in principle.  And only systems thinking thus conceived calls for an 
alternative, non-reductionist approach and thus a different kind of “reduction of complexity” – reduction not to 
aggregates of simple processes but to dynamic systems as integrated wholes.
 Many readers will not be familiar with the juxtaposition of science and technoscience as distinct modes of knowledge 2
production. This is not necessary. The distinction will take shape over the course of this discussion as different ways of 
conceiving synthetic biology become aligned with the different epistemic values and ideals of science and of 
technoscience (Bensaude-Vincent 2009, Forman 2007, Nordmann 2010b).
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II.  FAMILIAR CONCEPTS, DIVERGENT MEANINGS 
By engaging claims of what synthetic biology can be and what it should be, philosophical scrutiny 
sharpens awareness, exhibits what is at stake, and thereby facilitates scientific controversy as well 
as public debate. Since synthetic biology is said to bring an engineering approach to biology, these 
debates concern how one needs to understand biological systems for the purpose of achieving 
technical control. 
 Three issues, in particular, stand out. They involve conflicting notions of understanding,     
rationality, and design. Though each of them deserves separate treatment, we will see that they are 
framed by different images of knowledge production, images that we will encounter also in the 
stories one tells about biological systems and the relation of systems biology and synthetic biology. 
(1) Creating Understanding 
The first of these issues is contained in Richard Feynman’s oft-quoted statement “What I cannot 
create, I do not understand.”  This is a familiar issue in that it evokes philosophical positions that go 3
back to philosophers as diverse as Thomas of Aquinas, Francis Bacon, or Giambattista Vico.  4
Strictly speaking, it articulates a necessary, but not  sufficient condition for what it means to 
“understand” something. It can be paraphrased as follows: 
 No matter how good our scientific models or our explanatory and predictive theories are, these     
are not sufficient for “understanding” as long as another condition has not been fulfilled. This 
necessary condition is the requirement that with the help of these models or theories, one can create 
in one’s mind or in the laboratory the process or phenomenon in question.  5
 For philosophers of science, this formulation raises many problems , but one thing is clear:     6
According to this paraphrase, the ability to create appears as a crowning achievement, the final bit 
 A review article speaks of the “repetitively, almost dogmatically, cited Feynman quote“ (Rollié/Mangold/Sundmacher 3
2012). The source of the repetitively cited maxim is a photograph of “Feynman’s last blackboard” which can be found, 
for example, at http://archives.caltech.edu/pictures/1.10-29.jpg (accessed January 3, 2014), compare e.g. Schmidt 2009. 
 Aquinas argues that only God truly knows the world because he created it and one can only know what one creates 4
(Aquinas 1986); Bacon declared that the power to control or to make things is a criterion of knowledge (which is why 
the statement “knowledge is power” is often attributed to him, see e.g. Pamela Smith 2004, 238-241); Giambattista Vico 
distinguished mathematics and the sciences of human culture from the natural sciences on the grounds that only the 
former truly know their humanly produced subject (Vico 1979). The notion that making implies knowing has been 
expressed also by scientists and engineers. However, it has not been uncovered as a proper undercurrent of 
methodological thought. For the pre-history of synthetic biology, Jacques Loeb’s approach may have been particularly 
significant (Pauly 1987). 
 It is not clear why Feynman formulated this strong requirement on his “last blackboard.” This may have been his 5
objection to string theory in physics, or informed perhaps by his recent experience of discovering and demonstrating the 
cause of the Challenger space shuttle accident, see O’Malley 2009, 385-386.
 The paraphrase suggests, for example, that understanding is more than the ability to explain and predict something. 6
This prompts the empiricist suspicion that it is in this case too much to ask for scientific understanding. Also, if the 
material (re)production of a process or phenomenon is not the only way of creating what one seeks to understand, does 
the creation in one’s mind require intellectual tractability as in a thought-experiment, or would a highly complex 
computer simulation also fit the bill? 
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of evidence that proves all our previous thinking, our models and theories right. In the statement 
“what I cannot create, I do not understand”, the notion of “understanding” remains first and 
foremost an intellectual notion that refers to science as an effort of gaining understanding through 
theories and models.  
 Now, when it comes to synthetic biologists, some adopt this strict and narrow interpretation of     
Feynman’s statement. However, by embracing Feynman’s statement to the point of treating it as a 
fundamental credo,  synthetic biologists are expressing first and foremost that the seemingly 7
opposing goals of human understanding and material construction can be jointly satisfied even as 
one brings an engineering approach to biology. If one wants to engineer a biological structure or 
process, one “cannot help” but gain understanding, also (Benner/Sismour 2005, 538 and 542). If 
this is the fundamental message, it is still an open question.  However, what kind of understanding 
this is, and whether it serves as the capstone to theoretical knowledge production. Are synthetic 
biologists typically referring to the intellectually tractable, theoretical understanding that has been 
achieved, e.g. by systems biologists, and that is now ennobled and completed by efforts to actually 
create organismic structures? If only for the generally acknowledged large gaps in the explanation 
and prediction of biological phenomena, at least some synthetic biologists advance another way of 
paraphrasing Feynman’s credo: 
 The ability to create or recreate biological entities or structures proves that we know enough to     
do just that, and the more dexterity we acquire the better we understand what makes these entities or 
structures work – even if what is known explicitly is only fragmentary and if it is complemented by 
much tacit and procedural knowledge, including technical know-how. 
Unconcerned with Feynman’s intention and unconcerned with the grammatical construction of 
 “What I cannot create, I do not understand,” this paraphrase inverts the formula to read “What I     
can create, I do understand.”  The ability to create now appears as a sufficient condition for 8
understanding, suggesting that “understanding” can leap ahead of explanation and prediction, and 
that it derives from a more immediate relation of knowing and making.  To be sure, it is easy to 
 Famously, Craig Venter and his collaborators encoded in 2010 the Feynman quote as an identifying watermark in the 7
genetic code of the first chemically synthetized genome of a working bacterial cell. Notoriously, in so doing they 
misquoted Feynman ever so slightly.  
 Schmidt 2009 warns that the inversion of Feynman’s dictum does not follow logically from the original formulation. 8
For examples of authors who adopt the second reading, see section 3 below. But see also the example of Alfonso 
Jaramillo who proved quite committed to the second reading during his oral presentation at the CAS Conference 
Synthetic Biology (July 23 to 25, 2012, at the Biocenter of the LMU, Munich). Arguing for automatic design, 
computational evolution, high throughput characterization he claimed for these methods that one does not need that 
much (theoretical) knowledge about structure to succeed, and that they allow quantitative testing with and in spite of 
limited knowledge. In published work this is expressed in a more muted fashion, more careful, in particular, to advertise 
this as a virtue of his approach: “As our automated methodology uses few specifications as inputs, it could also be used 
to test new mechanisms and hypotheses despite the lack of a complete molecular understanding of the living 
cell” (Rodrigo/Landrain/Jaramillo 2012, 15274).
!4
dismiss the second paraphrase as not being in line with Feynman’s thinking, as being implausible 
from the start, or as being incompatible with the traditions and epistemic values of science 
(O’Malley 2009, 385-386). However, the philosophical analysis of synthetic biology cannot simply 
dismiss the second paraphrase but needs to reconstruct why it appears credible to those who 
maintain it. What is the “image of technoscience” that underwrites such an apparently “unscientific” 
conception of achieving understanding through making? What kind of learning takes place and 
what kind of knowledge is achieved if one submits to a program where one “cannot help but gain 
understanding” as one pursues a technical goal (Benner/Sismour 2005, 538 and 542)?  
 Here is one example, then, of questions for the philosophy of synthetic biology. After     
determining what is meant – in any given instance, but also in general terms – by appeals to 
Feynman’s dictum, it will discover, undoubtedly, a diversity of interpretations and usages which 
pose the challenge of reconstructing their intelligibility. Here, it might discover that the more 
familiar and less problematic first reading of the dictum as offering a necessary “capstone”-
condition for understanding  exaggerates and, idealizes the availability, scope, and power of 
explanatory theories in biology. At the same time, it may well discover successful design strategies 
that lend credibility to the seemingly more problematic notion of understanding a biological system 
while black-boxing mechanistic detail and without requiring intellectual tractability (MacLeod and 
Nersessian 2013). 
(2) Engineering Principles 
The second of the three issues concerns the familiar question of rationality, one that is typically 
understood by way of stark contrast. Either inquiry or engineering follow rational principles of 
construction and validation, or they are beholden to mere empiricism, haphazard tinkering, and 
exploratory experimentation.  This either-or reflects a particular point of view, namely one that 
ranks rational engineering or rational design higher than strategies of trial and error. Accordingly, 
the distinction is often used to probe how far our knowledge of the world has advanced. Those who 
are still working in the mode of trial and error have not ascended as yet to a level of intellectual and 
technical control that would allow them to invent new processes or devices simply from 
considerations of theory and principle. Thus, the idea of “rational drug design” was advanced in the 
1970s by biomedical researchers who were scandalized by the notion that in this day and age drug 
discovery should proceed by way of randomized search procedures. And after trial and error - in the 
form of automated high-throughput methods - triumphed over rational drug design (Adam 2010), 
the scientific community came back with nanomedicine and visions of targeted drug-delivery (“this 
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time we’ll get it right”). Similarly, the aspirations of synthetic biology are often judged in these 
terms: Can the “synthesis” of biological structures or processes proceed in a planned, deliberate, 
theory- and evidence-based manner such that the intended outcome issues as if from a blueprint 
(Giese et al. 2013, O’Malley 2009, Gramelsberger 2013, Lewens 2013)? And, if this is not the case, 
is this only “not yet” the case, likely to become possible in just a few more years, or does it owe to a 
disciplinary style of doing things – with chemists seeking rational control while bioengineers are 
more comfortable with tinkering?  Or does the failure of rational design owe to a limit of biological 
complexity that is irreducible and thus an insurmountable limit of control? 
 The hierarchical conception that places rational engineering above tinkering is blind to the     
possibility of rational tinkering.  This is because scientific rationality is tied to calculability 
(Berechenbarkeit) and the ability to plan in advance, thereby tied also to the notion of natural law 
and the predictive abilities that flow from it. From an engineering point of view, however, rational 
engineering principles may well be opposed to blind groping but they are not necessarily opposed to 
search strategies that exploit random variations and thus trial and error. They are also not opposed 
to design strategies that involve iterative processes of adaptation and tuning. These, to be sure, are 
rational strategies by which to work around limits of knowledge, and to achieve technical solutions 
in the absence of information about mechanical detail. In other words, these are rational strategies 
to create robust black boxes  or modules.  9
 Quite in line with this engineering point of view, appeals to the “design cycle” are at least as     
frequent in synthetic biology as those to Feynman’s dictum (e.g., Cheng/Lu 2012, Royal Academy 
of Engineering 2009, 18-23, Tabor 2012, UK Synthetic Biology Roadmap 2012, 13 ). Typically, the 
design cycle consists of three steps that are iterated until a desired technical performance is 
achieved. If the task is to create an informational technological expert system, or to create a climate 
model, the first step is to analyze the situation to be emulated, automated, or modeled. In a second 
step and on the basis of this analysis, a skeletal technical system is created. This first prototype is as 
far as the application of rational engineering principles will reach – it results from well-established 
procedures of mapping known features of the situation into a technical architecture. The third step 
consists in testing the prototype. Now, the performance of the prototype or model is observed and 
its ability assessed to emulate, automate, or model expert or climate behavior. At this point, any 
 The term “black box” refers to a technical unit of reliable functioning that is not and need not be scrutinized for the 9
specific causal processes that would account for its functioning (Royal Academy of Engineering 2009, 19-20). Not all 
modules in a modularized architecture are black boxes, but black boxes can serve as modules (see, paradigmatically, 
Canton/Labno/Endy 2008). Black-boxing is the decision or strategy to create black boxes. Eran Tal (2013) offers a 
critique of the notion of black box and seeks to identify instead rational strategies that provide “ignorance affordances.”  
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discrepancy between the actual and the desired performance of the prototypical system induces a 
second, third, and further iteration. Each new iteration begins with another analysis, but this is no 
longer an analysis primarily of the original situation but now of the technical system, and why it 
does not yet perform as desired. On the basis of this analysis (step one again), modifications are 
introduced, and an improved prototype is created that may serve to better tune the expert system or 
climate model to the target system (step two). Some of these modifications draw on specific 
scientific knowledge of features that may have been neglected and are now added in. Other 
modifications draw on familiar engineering strategies, such as adding noise in order to dampen 
sensitivity, and yet others are simply tried out to see whether this or that may do the trick. All of 
these modifications of the behavior of the designed system are compared against the target system 
(step 3), and subsequently rejected or further modified. With each iteration new elements are 
introduced and the designed system as a whole gains complexity. In the limit, the designed system 
emulates the target system near-perfectly and does so because it is similarly complex. Thus one 
finds that a predictively successful simulation model can be nearly as complex and just as 
intractable as the “natural” system that is modeled by it (see, e.g., Lenhard/Winsberg 2010). This is 
a technical achievement by rational means. Though it does not consist in the application of “rational 
engineering principles,” it is not “mere” tinkering either, but a strategy to systematically optimize 
the performance of a technical system.   
 For the philosophy of synthetic biology, the competing notions of rational engineering are of     
interest not only because they implicate the question of systemic limits of complexity: after all, ab 
initio rational engineering is possible only to the extent that calculability is even achievable. The 
different conceptions are of further interest because they speak to entirely different kinds of pursuit. 
On the one hand, there is science as an analytic enterprise which reduces complexity in order to 
arrive at principles which can be used to translate mechanistic accounts of biological processes into 
procedures of rational biological engineering. On the other hand, there is the technoscientific 
enterprise of synthetic biology which generates complexity by way of an iterative design process, 
that is, by way of a rational strategy to fine-tune engineered systems so that they can emulate 
biological systems. The philosophy of synthetic biology has thus to countenance at least the 
possibility of a research enterprise which seeks to exceed limits of intellectual tractability, of human 
understanding, or calculability; and does so in pursuit of technical robustness at ever higher levels 
of biological complexity. In this pursuit, the modules from which synthetic biology builds up 
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greater complexity can be black boxes that work together in reliable ways.  To be sure, when 10
engineers stuff matters of detail and complexity into a black box and then compose larger technical 
systems out of input-output relations among these modular black boxes, they are not just building 
up but also managing or handling complexity – without claiming, however, that what formerly 
looked complex now appears to be merely an aggregate of so many simple relations.  11
(3) Intelligent Design 
The third issue for a philosophy of synthetic biology arises from the previous two, and is a classic 
question also for the philosophy of biology: At first, everyone believed that species were designed 
by their creator. Then Darwin contradicted this. So, how is it possible even to speak of creation and 
design in biology? While anti-Darwinian theories of intelligent design are in ill-repute, how can 
synthetic biology speak of design processes and simultaneously take the insights of evolutionary 
biology into account?  
 Darwin showed that biological entities and processes are products of natural history and not of     
design. When synthetic biologists now get into the business of producing them by design, they are 
not thereby denying the ubiquitous and powerful action of evolution by natural selection upon 
anything that is subject to variation or less-than-perfect replication. On the assumption that they are 
interested in maintaining the continuity between the scientific naturalism of Darwinian biology and 
their engineering-oriented enterprise, synthetic biologists are therefore engaged in a philosophically 
significant effort. Implicitly and explicitly, conceptually and practically, they establish the 
compatibility of evolutionary and synthetic biology. This effort consists firstly and primarily of 
isolating the design efforts from evolutionary processes – be it by studying all organisms as if they 
were humanly engineered , be it by limiting the work of synthetic biology to closed industrial 12
 Note that for the analytic enterprise of science, the issue of calculability is central and, by the same token, the nature 10
of complexity or of emergent properties. Science seeks to know whether biological structures and processes are 
irreducible in principle or subject, sooner or later, to an analytic reduction of complexity. In contrast, the 
technoscientific interest in generating complexity is quite indifferent to this question. Perhaps, new and irreducible 
systems qualities emerge over the course of iterating the design cycle, perhaps not. No matter how one conceives the 
“limits of complexity,” the design process aims to overcome them (compare note 1).
 This important qualification owes to comments by Maureen O’Malley. “Reduction of complexity” usually and in this 11
text refers to an intellectual achievement: Complex phenomena can be reduced to simple processes and their aggregate 
effects. But some speak of a different kind of reduction of complexity: “synthetic biologists simplify and build” (Ferber 
2004, 158, also Calvert 2010). Whereas systems biology seeks total information and thus incorporates into its 
representational models all the findings of omics-research, synthetic biology wants to find out how far we can get with 
what little we know – it does not try to incorporate as much information as possible into the process of generating 
biological complexity. Synthetic biology attempts to find technical means which afford ignorance (Tal 2013), allowing 
it to succeed with less information rather than more. This might be considered synthetic biology’s technical “reduction” 
of complexity.
 In the terms of Daniel Dennett, after rejecting that natural organisms are the product of design, one can adopt a design 12
stance towards them and studying them as if they had been engineered.
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processes, be it by adopting design constraints that prevent replication, variation, or interaction with 
biological systems, or be it by downplaying the likelihood that synthetic biology might alter the 
course of evolution. Each of these approaches raises questions of its own. What holds true for all of 
them, is that by conceiving the same biological entity at one time as an object of design (as far as 
that will go), and at another time as an object of evolution (to the extent necessary), synthetic 
biologists are tending to the boundary between organism and artifact even as they appear to 
undermine or even reject it. 
 A second dimension of the relation between design and evolution comes in when the trial and     
error aspects of the design process are analogized to variation and selection. Variations are 
introduced more or less randomly into the design cycle and the resulting system behavior is then 
selected for, or selected against, in a process that adapts performance to expectations (e.g., Bujara 
and Panke 2010). Indeed, if the aim of synthetic biology is to generate complexity, it may well 
appear as if the goal was to reproduce the work of natural evolution, albeit in a more accelerated 
and more purposeful manner. At first sight, this would give license to saying that synthetic biology 
is biomimetic: that it merely seeks to emulate or imitate nature, and for that reason, that it is 
presumably more or less benign. This analogy is haunted, however, by the same problem that 
confronted Darwin’s analogy between artificial and natural selection, namely that there is place for 
a benign purpose, for a breeder or creator only in artificial selection, and not in natural history. 
Accordingly, strategies of trial and error that select proposed variations by way of performance 
criteria should be likened to artificial selection and breeding, not to natural selection and 
evolutionary history.  
 With the ambition, however, to reproduce the work of natural evolution in a more purposeful     
manner, the problem of technological hubris begins to raise its head as the biological engineer is 
likened to the divine creator that was banished from the modern scientific worldview (cf. 
Schummer 2011, 190-210). This ambition owes to a popular notion that preceded and accompanied 
the appearance of synthetic biology. This is the notion that in the development of human culture we 
are (“finally”) reaching the stage where we can take evolution into our hands. This notion implies 
not only that humanity is now fully in command of its own destiny, it implies also that we are no 
longer subject to the haphazard, cumbersome, and often inefficient ways of evolution (cf. Dyson 
2007). This is different from worrying that synthetic biologists are “playing God,” for, how could 
they, if there is no God in a scientific account of nature?  It is different also from looking at nature 
mechanistically in order to discover principles for the construction of mechanisms. Instead, this is a 
view that considers “nature” an engineer of sorts, one of us and one like us, who is in the business 
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of designing biological artifacts and whose creations are considered to be wonderfully subtle and 
intricate but also as a bit round-about, full of redundancy, and perhaps unnecessarily complicated. 
As an engineer, nature is constrained by evolutionary history, by the relative fixity of species, and a 
small range of variations. In contrast, synthetic biologists or genetic engineers are not limited by 
lineages and the restrictions they impose on the gene-pool. This gives them the significant 
advantage of not having to work as slowly and conservatively as evolution by natural selection. 
 Once one arrives at this image of technological hubris, a last and perhaps most remarkable fact     
about synthetic biology needs to be countenanced, namely the near-absence in the scientific 
literature and in review articles of explicit discussions of synthetic biology’s possibly problematic 
relation to evolutionary biology.  But surely, there must be an explanation for this and perhaps the 13
fault lies with those who see the need for this discussion. On the whole, perhaps, synthetic 
biologists need not worry about the consistency of the scientific world-view of evolutionary biology 
and their own technoscientific mind-set. Molecular biology has shown that one can engage in 
structural investigations without immediate reference to theories of evolution. Not unlike engineers 
in other fields, it is proving quite sufficient for molecular and synthetic biologists to work along 
pragmatic lines: “If there are laws of nature, we can’t violate them anyhow, and in the meantime, it 
is our job to push the limits of technical possibility.” In other word, attempts to probe what can be 
done by way of creating biological entities and processes do not advance ideas that need to be fitted 
into a larger biological world-view; instead, they merely find themselves more or less constrained 
by some general facts of nature (Nordmann 2010a).     
 The very questions of how biological engineering should be related to natural history, or of how     
evolution by natural selection differs from the design of biological artifacts thus depend on our 
conception of synthetic biology – is it an intellectual enterprise with at least some theoretical 
ambitions or should one judge its attempt to advance understanding of biological systems only in 
engineering terms? Only in the former case does the problem arise of having to reconcile the 
competing ideas of evolution and design, while in the latter case it is merely a practical challenge to 
insulate as far as possible the construction of biological entities and processes from the vagaries of 
evolutionary influence. This fault line  between synthetic biology as somewhat theory-oriented and 
 The place where evolutionary considerations are most likely to appear is in “what if” scenarios that begin by 13
valorizing synthetic biology and portraying its success at creating artificial organisms.  Only then the question is asked 
what will happen once these are subject to evolution – either by way of “mutating” from benign to dangerous 
organisms, or by way of their ability to outcompete natural organisms, changing the make-up of biological diversity, 
and the like. The engagement with evolutionary concepts thus tends to begin only when synthetic biologists look at the 
potential impact of their work through the perspective of technology assessment. Arguably, though, it should enter in 
right at the beginning of their work, in reflections on the rhyme and reason of naturally evolved biological complexity.  
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as exclusively engineering-oriented also separates the two ways of paraphrasing Feynman’s dictum 
as well as the two conceptions of rational engineering. It is the fault line that runs between science 
and technoscience. 
III.  FROM SYSTEMS BIOLOGY TO SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 
So far, we have been considering only conceptual issues that resonate with familiar discussions in 
the philosophy of science and that receive another turn of the screw through the contemplation of 
synthetic biology. These have drawn our attention to the general scientific or technoscientific 
character of synthetic biology which, in turn, refers us to its history. Promoters and observers of 
synthetic biology position it on the one hand in respect to the history of the biological sciences, and 
on the other hand to the prospects of biological engineering, and to biology as a technoscience. In 
particular, they position it in respect to systems biology that may have laid the groundwork for the 
appearance of synthetic biology. But as to how, and to what extent, there are different stories that 
can be told. Of these, only two will be juxtaposed here.  The first treats the move from systems 14
biology to synthetic as the consequence of a paradigm-shift or a whole new chapter in the history of 
the biological sciences, one that revolves around systems-thinking as the best way of coming to 
terms, intellectually, with complexity. The second treats synthetic biology as a technoscience that 
considers systems only as more or less efficient units of technical functioning, and that goes beyond 
our simple intellectual ways by seeking the means for generating or increasing complexity.  15
(1) Sublime Thinking 
The first of these stories underwrites a comprehensive report that was commissioned by the German 
Ministry of Research BMBF and that gave rise to the present volume. It goes as follows. Biology 
has run up against the limits of complexity as it has tried to become a lawful and predictive natural 
science in the guise of molecular biology. Under the heading of “evo-devo” this was pointed out by 
a coalition of biological researchers and philosophers of biology. Processes of self-organization, 
laws of form, the reciprocal relations between a biological entity and its environment – all these 
were thought to elude the grasp of a physico-chemical methodology that needs to isolate and control 
 For a sketch of a third story, see note 20 below. - Like all myths of origin, these three are idealized to the point of 14
caricature, and they are told for reasons not of descriptive accuracy but of the moral they contain. Each in its own way 
has normative implications, suggesting what synthetic biology ought to be and what opportunities and risks it poses, 
what obligations and expectations come with it.
 Following upon and adding to the section on “familiar concepts, divergent meanings” the two stories might be said to 15
expose the divergent meanings within synthetic biology of the notion of “system.”
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specific causal processes as much as possible. There appeared to be only one way for biology to 
move forward and to become predictive or even constructive. It had to take biological complexity 
seriously, that is, to understand biological structures at least from the cellular level upwards as 
systems that exhibit the dynamics which are the subject of a general system science or a theory of 
non-linear complexity.  This way of “learning from nature” led to systems biology which, in turn, 16
prepared the ground for synthetic biology which, on this account, can be understood as applied 
systems biology: The processes of self-organization that are the subject of systems biology  are 
applied in synthetic biology to the task of engineering biological structures. Inversely, synthetic 
biology can be said to contribute to basic biological science in that it constructs and exhibits 
structures and systems for study.  
 A kind of paradigm-shift within science thus becomes a paradigm-shift for engineering, too     
(Schmidt, this volume). Just as the science of biology has moved from causal analysis by physico-
chemical means to the identification of dynamic patterns through systems thinking, so 
bioengineering is moving from the science-based construction of genetic blueprints to synthetic 
biology as a form of engineering that harnesses self-organized growth for the creation of novel 
artifacts. Accordingly, the most prominent risk of synthetic biology is the release of synthetic 
organisms, and the disruptions these technologically evolved structures might cause in naturally 
evolved systems. By the same token, our best protection is awareness of the sensitive dependencies 
of complex systems – if synthetic biologists avoid making their constructs too robust, or avoid 
making them independent of very specific environmental conditions, all might be well (e.g. Schmidt 
2009, 96-97). Complexity demands respect and this respect, in turn, might assure the proper 
fragility of artificial organisms that will not be able to survive outside the very special contexts for 
which they were synthesized or grown.  
 This first story of the rationale for systems biology and its application in synthetic biology is     
normative in that it demands that the research by synthetic biologists properly applies systems 
biology.  This takes the form, for example, of maintaining that synthetic biologists ought to 17
incorporate noise into the design process – not as something that needs to be minimized, corrected 
for, or excluded; but as something that in a proper understanding of biological systems is an 
essential feature of any self-regulatory biological system, natural or engineered. How one deals with 
 Here, then, “complexity” becomes a theoretical term that differentiates complex systems from merely very 16
complicated aggregates of simple processes (see note 1 above). 
 This normative insistence on proper systems thinking extends the debate within and about systems biology 17
(Wolkenhauer/Mesarovic 2005, O’Malley and Dupre 2005).
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noise (as a disturbing factor or as essential element) is thus said to betray whether one is or isn’t 
truly engaged in systems thinking (Schmidt 2014, Gleich et al. 2012).  
(2) Technical Opportunities  
The first story ended on a note of suspicion. Despite its being called “systems biology,” it appears 
unclear what is meant by “system” here. Does one mean a dynamic structure that requires general 
systems theory or a theory of non-linear complex dynamics to describe it, or does one mean a 
technical construct that consists of at least several interacting parts?  
 If it turns out that many or most systems and synthetic biologists do not aspire to a holistic way     
of thinking, a second story can be told. It is a story of technical opportunism according to which the 
concepts, theories, and methods of biology, biochemistry, and genetic engineering become absorbed 
into an engineering idiom. This second story does not begin with philosophical insights about a 
non-mechanistic type of causality, about the profound difference between organism and mechanism, 
about biological complexity and systematic limits of molecular biology. Instead, it begins with the 
lessons learned from the Human Genome Project. On the one hand, the project represented a 
triumph of analytic methods, having been completed sooner and more efficiently than anticipated – 
an achievement that continues as genomics produces cheaper and faster methods by the year, if not 
by the month or day. On the other hand, it delivered a blow to straightforward genetic determinism 
in the sense that only very few single genes can be correlated to single traits. This insight prompted 
neither retreat nor profound reorientation, however, but an attitude of “offense is the best defense.” 
If the causal determinants of dispositions, traits and also of disease are far more complicated – and 
“complex” only in this sense – one needs to expand the tool-set developed for the Human Genome 
Project, and for that one requires the accumulation of yet more data, trusting that new insights and 
tools will be generated by the ever-improving technologies for the representation and processing of 
large data-sets. This data-fetishism and the many kinds of “omics” proved pervasive in the funding 
and organization of research, even without enjoying much intellectual prestige. The mere 
accumulation of data and the race to fully map genomes and proteomes appears rather pedestrian, 
and this is where systems biology comes in. It provides a kind of format and form, rationale and 
rationalization for the idea of “total information” and its accumulation. This rationale comes from 
the idea that one might model whole structures and organisms by integrating as many data as 
possible and by approximating a complete description of a biological “system” (which is nothing 
more on this account than an aggregate of very many components and causal pathways).  
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 Since the computer served not only as the tool but also as the site of much systems biology     
research, it became apparent that computers are far more than devices for the storage and 
organization, representation and modeling of data. Computers are physical systems in their own 
right that can instantiate dynamic processes such that the behaviors of data-systems can be created, 
modulated, and observed, such that input-output relations can be studied, such that control can be 
achieved and stabilized even as the particular causal pathways remain opaque.  It is this fact that 
leads  from systems biology to synthetic biology in the second story.  Here, systems biology comes 18
first and takes priority only because it integrates a multitude of data in order to represent biological 
systems such that they can be studied and understood. Synthetic biology comes second and short-
circuits the ambitions of systems biology: Where the latter produces representations, synthetic 
biology takes these as substitutions, that is, it regards model systems that are subject to modulation 
and control in silico as a prototype for the construction, modulation and control of biological 
systems. Thus, while systems biology begins by capturing complexity and rendering it for the 
purpose of reducing complexity through theoretical modeling, synthetic biology does not demand 
theoretical understanding and the reduction of complexity but has learned from systems biology that 
complexity can be generated in a controlled manner.  19
 Though synthetic biology shares many of its ambitions with genetic engineering and other fields     
of molecular and bioengineering, it is engineering not by way of creating a knowledge-based 
hypothesis-driven blueprint of how things should work, and then implementing it. As suggested 
above, it does not work in the mode of rational engineering. But it is also far more than mere 
tinkering, trial and error, and the development of automated high-throughput search strategies – 
though these have a role to play. Synthetic biology is opportunistic by asking strategically how 
much technological knowledge and control one can achieve with what little we know scientifically, 
 Computation for systems biology enabled better ways to “acquire, store, analyze, graphically display, model, and 18
distribute” information. Without yet going there, the discussion of computer models in systems biology prepares the 
ground for the exploitation of what they afford in terms of performance, behavior, intervention and construction (Ideker/
Galitski/Hood 2001, 347-353) . This holds also for that brand of systems biology that takes complexity seriously. Here 
the proposals by Kitano (2002 and 2004), for example, mark the point of transition. He advocates engineering concepts 
and computing tools for the purposes of modeling, representation, and theoretical understanding of biological 
complexity. He thereby paves the way for modes of constructing and handling such systems without reference to 
complexity theory: his concepts and tools afford their employment towards constructive ends by synthetic biology 
(O’Malley et al. 2008, 62). – This point of transition is also discussed by Schmidt (this volume). He sees bioengineers 
who adopt systems thinking. The story of technical opportunism sees systems thinking appropriated and vulgarized by 
the ordinary idiom of engineering (Nordmann 2010a).   
 Gabriele Gramelsberger identifies the simulation approach as a common denominator of systems and synthetic 19
biology and suggests that it provides rational design methods that support tinkering in the lab (Gramelsberger 2013). 
She thereby downplays that modelling in systems biology is said to be “for basic research (i.e. generating knowledge) 
whereas synthetic biology’s modelling is for the design of constructs” (O’Malley et al. 2008, 62): “Ultimately, 
mathematical models developed for research purposes (e.g. in systems biology) will be employed as design models in 
synthetic biology” (Heinemann/Panke 2006, 2796).  
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finding that through an iterative design process one can achieve a great deal. The IGEM 
competition pursues this strategy most overtly as a proof of concept that US undergraduate students 
can “do” synthetic biology (Check 2005, see also Dyson 2007, Delgado 2013). This type of 
engineering is inspired by software engineering, for example, by the creation of expert systems 
which tune models to performance parameters, enriching the models until they achieve the desired 
functionality. According to this story, the impact of synthetic biology is first and foremost on the 
culture of research and the way of doing science itself. And the “risks” associated with synthetic 
biology concern societal expectations of the kind of knowledge and experience that is needed for 
the adoption, assessment and regulation of technologies; they thus concern our tolerance for black-
boxed processes. This has been discussed, for example, in respect to the “kludge” as a module in a 
large software program or in an engineered assembly of biological pathways which plays an 
unknown, yet apparently necessary, role for the correct functioning of the system (O’Malley 2009, 
2011, compare Lenhard/Winsberg 2010). 
(3) (Techno)Scientific Biology 
Having heard first the story of sublime ascendance to systems thinking in engineering and then the 
story of technical opportunism for building up un-theorized complexity, it is finally important to 
reflect on the juxtaposition of these stories or the starkness of their opposition.   20
 There is a strong temptation to believe that the two stories about the relation of systems biology     
and synthetic biology are easily reconciled, that they are but two sides of the same coin (Breithaupt 
2006, compare Kastenhofer 2013a, 2013b): Synthetic biology advances profound theoretical 
understanding of biological systems even as it opportunistically pursues an engineering approach to 
the design and creation of biological entities and processes. This would amount to denying that 
there are profoundly different ways of conceiving synthetic biology.  And to the extent that there is 
a philosophical difference to speak of, it would appear to be one that has been rather familiar since 
the times of Kant, namely the tension between a holistic understanding of organisms and the 
mechanistic materialism of modern science. It might be sufficient – and this would be an argument 
for reconciliation and business as usual – that synthetic biology is dedicated to theoretical 
 There are other stories that could be told. One does not have to assume that synthetic biology is somehow derived 20
from, or intimately related to, systems biology. Instead, one might foreground the relation between chemistry and 
biology as exemplified, for example, by the work of Steven Benner (Benner/Chen/Yang 2011). Just as physicists were 
told, many years ago, that there wasn’t much work to be done in physics anymore but that they might find interesting 
problems in biology, so chemists have been told a similar story in recent years (I owe this suggestion to H. Ulrich 
Göringer). On this account, it is the chemical approach that distinguishes synthetic biology and genetic engineering. The 
possibility that the “synthetic” in synthetic biology derives from synthetic chemistry was discussed by Bernadette 
Bensaude-Vincent (2013b, compare 2009b and 2009c).        
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understanding as well as the constructive project of building up ever more complex biological 
structures. It sometimes does so in the name of an ambitiously holistic notion of “system” and 
sometimes in reference to a rather more mechanistic conception of a system as a complicated unit of 
technical functioning.     
 Against this proposed reconciliation and the notion that synthetic biology can have it all, the     
present analysis suggests that there is no easy way out. If there is anything different and new about 
synthetic biology, it may well consist in the way it challenges the traditional orientation of the 
biological sciences and even of biotechnological research. Indeed, it would be a misunderstanding 
of  the juxtaposition of the two stories about systems and synthetic biology if one took it simply to 
rehash the contrast of irreducible holism vs. reductionist mechanism. Instead, the debate of holism 
vs. mechanism belongs altogether to the first story which is driven by theoretical concerns and 
debates. According to the first story, systems and synthetic biology constitute a paradigm-shift of 
sorts, and it is entirely within that story that anti-reductionist “systems thinking” prevails over 
attempts to reduce biological phenomena to deterministic causal relations that can be isolated in the 
laboratory or in the mind.  
 If the debate between different intellectual conceptions belongs to the first story, it is     
characteristic for the second that the clash between competing research paradigms and all its 
attendant questions fade away and become irrelevant. Questions of reductionism, of natural 
philosophy, or the fundamental difference of organism and artifact are of no concern to the technical 
opportunism of synthetic biology. These questions are neither answered nor dismissed, but merely 
absorbed into an engineering idiom (Nordmann 2010a).  The engineering approach of synthetic 
biology is not holistic or engaged in systems thinking as it builds up complexity in a controlled 
manner through iterations of the design cycle (pace Schmidt, this volume), but it is also not 
mechanistic.  Likewise, it does not challenge in a profound or principled manner the difference 
between artefact and organisms as it constructs a robust black box which, in its opacity, is not at all 
unlike the biological organism as a black box with stable behavioral patterns.  
 To put it a bit metaphorically, then, in relation to systems biology, the two stories about synthetic     
biology do not attribute to the researchers different theories, opinions, or beliefs but an entirely 
different mind-set, a different way of living the laboratory life, of participating in history and 
relating to the tradition of science and the Enlightenment. On the one hand, there is the scientific 
mind-set of those who query the limits of reductionism and embrace systems thinking; on the other 
hand is the technoscientific mind-set of those who no longer seek the most appropriate way of 
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reducing complexity and promoting intellectual understanding, but who proceed instead to generate 
biological complexity from available theories and techniques. 
IV.  SCENES OF CONFLICT 
We first saw the fault lines between scientific and technoscientific orientations of research that 
separate different notions of understanding, rationality, and design. We then saw how these fault 
lines provide contour and organize the stark juxtaposition of two powerfully coherent stories about 
the origin of synthetic biology and its relation to system biology. The easy way out would be to blur 
these boundaries and vaguely have it all. By blocking this easy way out, the terrain has been laid 
out.  In a third step, we can now observe how researchers position themselves in this terrain. 
Though it is possible to wear different hats at different times—in one context advancing theory 
development and the reduction of complexity, in another context promoting the design of highly 
complex entities—this does not hold for publications that each belong to just one context. Any 
given publication expresses only one mind-set, exhibits one research agenda, establishes one kind 
of relation to its object. So, even if researchers might not position themselves unambiguously, every 
particular publication can be assigned a definite place on the map.  
 Different researchers engage in different research practices, and by looking at the published     
products of these research practices we can see how the same researchers can belong to very 
different epistemic communities in that their work is informed by different values, methods, 
standards of evidence and criteria of success.  Therefore, questions, issues, and hypotheses can be 21
sharpened by treating the publications of synthetic biology as scenes of conflict between the values 
of the different epistemic communities. In conclusion then, we might cast a brief glance at three 
such scenes of conflict. 
 Arguably, the initial promise and attractiveness of synthetic biology is much like that of nanotechnology. However, 21
the clash between epistemic communities is far less pronounced in nanotechnology than in the case of synthetic biology. 
Nanotechnological research is “pure technoscience” because it is geared to the development of basic capabilities of 
control that generally expand the toolset of technology – it isn’t dedicated to any one engineering agenda but seeks to 
recruit scientific theories, scientific expertise, scientific labor for the purpose of putting technological change on a new 
footing. Nanotechnology is thus an effort to retool the scientific enterprise by dedicating the accumulated knowledge, 
methods, and personnel for knowledge production to a different, perhaps complementary end. Synthetic biology is 
“pure technoscience” in a different way.  It does not seek to retool or rededicate laboratories and academically trained 
researchers. Instead it seeks to produce new kinds of researchers even before it produces new kinds of biological 
entities. The creation of epistemic communities with non-traditional values is part of what synthetic biology is and, for 
some of its protagonists, what it ought to be. The promise and attractiveness of synthetic biology thus lies also in its 
appeal to a new generation of researchers. This is somewhat problematic, however, since the staging of a generational 
conflict over epistemic ideals does not go so well with the idea of drawing together a diverse group of researchers.
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(1) Accommodating Ignorance 
One does not have to cast far and wide to find scenes where different epistemic and, indeed, 
generational communities clash in the field of synthetic biology.  This occurs at any conference 
where senior researchers confront so-called iGEM teams that impatiently seek to achieve on 
extremely short time-scales what others frame in terms of multidisciplinary, sometimes career-long 
research trajectories. This discrepancy of expectations cannot be ascribed simply to naïveté on one 
side and many years of experience on the other. The iGEM teams seek to find out through a 
strategic design process how much they can achieve with what little they know. They are not held 
back by seeking to learn all that would be needed for rationally engineering some biological 
structure or entity. Instead, they are invited and resolved to short-circuit the scruples of their 
teachers. If science is about the search for knowledge in order to reduce specific areas of ignorance, 
iGEM’s technoscientific approach acquires a kind of working knowledge that can work around and 
accommodate ignorance. 
 Such scenes of conflict rarely take the form of overt disagreement, opposition, or antagonism. As     
with the encouragement of iGEM teams also within relatively conservative departments, they can 
involve something like the turning of a blind eye to the differences. An issue of Nature dated 
January 21, 2010 provides such a scene of conflict. Its featured article, Roberta Kwok’s “Five Hard 
Truths for Synthetic Biology,” offers a review of five major obstacles to the ambitions of synthetic 
biology and the prospects for overcoming them.  
 The text begins, predictably enough, by pointing to the “daunting knowledge gap when it comes     
to how life works” and, quoting Christina Agapakis, to the fact that “there’s a lot of biology that 
gets in the way of the engineering.” It goes on to show, however, that synthetic biologists are 
undaunted by the daunting knowledge gap and that they might have ways to meet the key 
challenges which they encounter all along the way. The first difficulty of defining standardized 
biological parts provokes efforts to substitute relative for absolute measures, thereby taking a first 
stab at evading Martin Fussenegger’s verdict that “[t]his is the type of complexity that is very 
difficult to capture by standardized characterization.” The second difficulty is the familiar 
predicament that predictable design procedures are not available, whereas trial and error is too 
arduous. Here, the synthetic biologist’s answer is said to consist in a process of directed evolution, 
i.e., the design cycle and its iteration “until the system is optimized.” The third difficulty arises as 
one moves to ever greater levels of system complexity which prompts the proposal to overcome the 
bottleneck by automating the process quasi-robotically, or by using bacteria as assemblers. In order 
to avoid unexpected interactions – the fourth difficulty – procedures need to be found to insulate the 
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biological machinery to be designed as far away as possible from a cell’s “natural machinery.”  And 
the final difficulty is to avoid variability and to increase stability, for example, by using noise to 
one’s advantage rather than try to eliminate it. Accordingly, the review closes on a note of cautious 
optimism that synthetic biology can move forward without closing the daunting knowledge gap: 
 “As the cost of DNA synthesis continues to drop and more people begin to tinker with biological     
parts, the field could progress faster, says [Rob] Carlson.  ‘It’s a question of whether the 
complexity of biology yields to that kind of an effort.’” (Kwok 2010, 290) 
In summary of Kwok’s arguments, then, she argues on all five points of difficulty that the only 
chance for synthetic biology to succeed is by way of design processes that can accommodate or 
work around ignorance.  
 But how do the editors of Nature relate Kwok’s assessment of the first decade of synthetic     
biology? On the tenth anniversary of the repressilator and a switchable regulatory network, they 
declare that “[c]ontributions to and from basic science are the part of synthetic biology that most 
deserves celebration”: 
 “Both of those pioneering experiments transposed two great traditions of physics to biology:     
first, to understand something one must build it, and second, start from the simplest imaginable 
principles. These directives have set the basic-science agenda for synthetic biology: to design, 
and thus define, the minimal systems sufficient to produce a given function. […] Bringing these 
applications to reality has proved much harder than was originally hoped (see [Roberta Kwok’s 
analysis]). But the difficulties have proved instructive. Indeed, the decade-old papers raised 
several new and fundamental issues in biology, for example by pointing to the crucial role of 
noise in gene expression, both as a nuisance and as a great computational opportunity. It is now 
an active area of research. […] It took endeavours in synthetic biology to illustrate what systems 
biology perhaps should mean: to enlist mathematical formalism in producing biological insights 
that are beyond the reach of mere intuition.” (Nature editorial 2010) 
The editors thus try to assimilate Kwok’s analysis into the traditional idiom of basic vs. applied 
science. This is the vain attempt to accommodate the epistemic ideals of a technoscientific design 
community within that of traditional science. In which sense, for example, is the design of the 
repressilator an “experiment?” Is “to understand something one must build it” really a principle of 
physics as a basic science? How and when is “to design” the same thing as “to define” – even if one 
considers operational rules as definitions, what is defined by the complete “design” of a minimal 
system? What makes the synthetic bottom-up design of a minimal cell preferable to the classically 
analytic “knock-out” methodology if the aim is to discover the contribution of individual genes to 
the workings of a cell? And, finally, the editorial states that biology moves beyond the reach of 
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mere intuition when aided by mathematical tools. Does this not imply that knowledge or 
understanding now reside in the ability to build a computer model, rather than in theories that are 
tractable by the human mind?   22
 Here, then, the scene of conflict appears as an unresolved tension within a pair of texts that does     
not wish to acknowledge, and turns a blind eye to the profound difference in the conception of a 
research field that contributes to basic biological science and one that pursues a knowing-by-
building design agenda. 
(2) Discontinuous Continuities 
In their 2010 paper on “Engineering in Complex Systems” Matthias Bujara and Sven Panke also 
produce an argument that explores the tension between different epistemic communities, those of 
knowledge-based rational design and those of “evolutionary” design that feeds variation and 
selection into the iterations of a design cycle.  They distinguish three types of optimization 23
strategies, showing that designers can work more effectively if they know what they are looking for, 
that is, what to vary and what to select for: 
 Random evolution based on mutagenesis and brute force screening only requires limited     
knowledge on [sic]  the system but the cause for the beneficial effect frequently remains unclear. 
Directed evolution needs at least knowledge of the element that should be modified (e.g. gene, 
promoter, or ribosome binding site), while a detailed optimization strategy is not needed. 
Combinatorial design follows a semi-rational strategy based on characterized parts and 
compensates for the current lack of detailed instructions for a comprehensive blueprint for 
optimization. (2010, 589) 
The progression from “random evolution” to “combinatorial design” thus involves an increase of 
knowledge about the elements to be modified and the functions to be achieved which is illustrated 
by a very telling graph that extrapolates from the three “evolutionary” strategies all the way to 
rational engineering. 
 The editors’ text continues here in agreement with the story of technical opportunism which was told above and 22
which contradicts the idea that synthetic biology advances basic science: “In that aspect [of using mathematical 
formalism to manage data beyond human intuition], synthetic and systems biology now seem indissociable.”
 See section 1.3., above, as to why “evolutionary design” is an oxymoronic misnomer. Though they both work with 23
variation and selection, Darwinian evolution by natural selection is different from breeding by artificial selection: what 
is selected for and against in natural selection does not depend on the specifications of a designer, but on adaptedness to 
the complex and changing conditions of life. What Bujara and Panke are referring to is more appropriately called 
“design by breeding.” 
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Reproduced from Bujara and Panke 2010, 588 
By suggesting a continuous progression from “evolutionary” to rational design, this graph stands in 
a peculiar relation to the main body of Bujara and Panke’s paper. The paper speaks primarily to the 
discontinuous differences between the three modes of iterative design and it does not address at all 
the growth of knowledge beyond the “current status of biological system engineering.” In particular, 
it does not suggest that the further development e.g. of combinatorial design strategies will produce 
the knowledge base that would be required for rational design. Indeed, the paper does not even 
suggest that rational design is more effective than evolutionary design – it appears to be more 
superior only in being more “rational,” that is, in being knowledge-based.  In addition to supplying 24
all these added considerations, the most interesting feature of this graph is that the demands of 
knowledge loom like a dark cloud above the scene, rendering the image highly ambivalent: On the 
one hand, it tells a story of progress and a sequence of steps towards the ultimate goal of rational 
design based on a comprehensive blueprint for optimization. On the other hand, it identifies a 
daunting demand for knowledge, prompting the reader either to abandon this trajectory with a 
 The graph suggests continuity and thus makes the implicit, albeit highly problematic, assumption that the knowledge 24
required for better ways of running the design cycle is the kind of knowledge that could provide the basis for rational 
design. Indeed, in their paper Bujara and Panke question that “reducing the complexity of biological systems will 
facilitate its engineering,” commenting that this is only “a hypothesis that still needs to be confirmed in the 
laboratory” (2010, 589). This cautionary remark applies to the reduction of complexity by an increase of knowledge of 
causal relations and also to its reduction by insulating engineered biological systems from natural ones. If it were 
possible to run such an experiment, the laboratory test proposed by Bujara and Panke would measure the scientific 
assignment of priority always to the improvement of causal knowledge against technoscientific requirements of what it 
takes to achieve effective control. And if the hypothesis would fail to be confirmed, discontinuity would be 
reestablished. 
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gloomy outlook on the future of synthetic biology or else to seek out an alternative trajectory that 
bypasses the need for all this knowledge but accommodates ignorance.  
 This moment of ambivalence leads to another scene of conflict. Here, anxiety about departing     
from the respectable path of science becomes transformed into a hopeful image of continuity and a 
belief in the fusion of opposites. At the beginning of a review of two methods for the more reliable 
construction of gene circuits one finds a double-pronged credo: “Engineered organisms enable 
studies of the general organizing principles of life and have the potential to transform industries 
including medicine, agriculture and energy” (Tabor 2012, 1061). Noting that “[s]ynthetic biologists 
must often iterate through cycles of optimization when composing even well-understood parts,” 
Jeffrey Tabor welcomes a method that accelerates this design process by offering a standardized 
“plug-and-play” modification scheme.  Aside from speeding up the achievement of the desired 25
system performance, this method is “also more scalable and amenable to future automation.” In the 
conclusion of his review, Tabor returns to the initial credo not only with respect to the 
transformation of industries but also in regard to the study of the general organizing principles of 
life. He could easily make the point now that the design process is a kind of technical probing and 
as such in and of itself a way of studying these organizing principles of life. However, by 
“studying” Tabor means something akin to theoretical understanding. Accordingly he first notes a 
tension between the advance of design methocalcds and the search for true understanding, and then 
proceeds to dissolve this tension:   
 “As automated circuit design and assembly dovetails with iterative optimization, our ability to     
engineer circuits should extend beyond our ability to truly understand how they work. The 
tractability of modularly constructed synthetic circuits, however, should also feed back to accelerate 
the cycle of hypothesis generation and testing in systems biology.” (Tabor 2012, 1063) 
 Along the lines of “what I can create, I can also understand” Tabor proposes that by synthesis     
engineers learn what it takes to get something to work. Systems biology can then take this up to 
generate and test hypotheses about the way in which nature gets analogous things to work. He thus 
arrives at a fusion of design practice and hypothesis testing, but this should not be mistaken for a 
fusion of technoscientific synthetic biology and scientific notions of truly understanding how things 
 Tabor offers an epistemologically telling description of the design-cycle approach: „Here, the first design is based on 25
the ligand-inhibited repressors LacI and TetR. Each is initially placed upstream of an associated fluorescent reporter on 
a polycistronic mRNA. The operons show poor reporter expression, which is then improved by ‘plugging in’ additional 
copies of the appropriate promoter upstream of each reporter. This increases reporter expression, but reveals that the 
circuit cannot reach the TetR-dominated state. The tetR promoter is then swapped for a stronger version, but this 
overcompensates for the problem making only the TetR state stable. A library of random tetR ribosome binding sites 
(RBSs) is then screened, and a variant that hits the bistable sweet spot is found” (Tabor 2012, 1063, compare Litcofsky 
et al. 2012).
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work. After all, when Tabor speaks of the accelerated generation and testing of hypotheses that 
extend beyond our ability to understand them, he can only be referring to the iterative design 
process in systems biology that leads to the construction of computer models that step in where 
humans reach the limits of their ability to understand. Accordingly, Tabor’s image of the fusion of 
gene-circuit construction with the study of organizing principles of life amounts to the construction 
in parallel of two technical systems, one in vitro or in vivo, the other in silico, each built through a 
strategic process of generating complexity, such that one can be said to model or instantiate the 
causal dynamics of the other: It is not the human mind but the computer simulation that 
“understands” organizing principles of life by learning to model the engineered structures of 
synthetic biology. Thus, the simulation “understands” these in virtue of resulting from a similar 
iterative design processes. Accordingly, Tabor’s construction of continuity between circuit 
engineering and achievements of understanding leaves untouched the break with the epistemic 
values and traditional ideals of science. 
(3) The Matter of Definition 
According to Jeffrey Tabor, synthetic and systems biology can exploit how engineered biological 
devices and engineered computer models inform each other in various ways. This fundamental 
notion had already found expression in Tabor’s student days when he helped produce one of the 
founding moments of synthetic biology in the popular imagination. He co-designed a roughly 
10cm² “lawn” of e-coli bacteria that served as a light-sensitive biofilm which produced the message 
“hello world.” Not only is this friendly greeting the first thing that Tabor’s bacteria say to us when 
we ask them to speak, “hello world” are also the first words that computers programmers learn to 
program and that verify the working of a programming language or computer system.    26
 Quite in the spirit of “hello world,” when synthetic biologists aim to construct synthetic     
organisms, what they do is take biological knowledge, techniques, and parts in order to build up a 
complex artificial systems that can stand in for natural biological systems. As such, what they are 
doing with biological tools is what bioinformatics modelers do with computing tools and 
algorithms, namely build up a complex artificial system that for explorative purposes takes the 
place of natural biological systems.  Synthetic biology is thus “synthetic” firstly in the sense of not 27
 Compare the Wikipedia entry “Hello world program.”26
 “[A]s opposed to simulation models transformed into a computational algorithm and run on a digital computer, here 27
the theoretical model rendered as a synthetic model is of the same ‘natural kind’ as the native networks as well as being 
embedded in a simulation environment of the ‘same materiality,’ i.e., the host organism” (Knuutila/Loettgers, 168). 
Knuutila and Loettgers argue that this supports a “basic-science approach to synthetic biology.” However, whether it 
actually does this or not depends on the question whether one can pick out “theoretical models” as traditionally 
conceived. 
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being analytic, of generating rather than reducing complexity, and secondly in the sense of being a 
non-natural, artificial biology, that is, in virtue of engineering not within the domain of the natural, 
but entirely within the sphere of the synthetic even as it utilizes knowledge about and materials 
from the material sphere of the biological. This is what sets it apart from molecular biology as well 
as genetic engineering.     28
 Classical science or the pursuit to reduce complexity for the purpose of explanation, calculation     
and mechanistic control assumes the standpoint of an antagonism between mind and world, theory 
and reality. How can the mind with its limited means and its peculiar demand for human 
intelligibility forge agreement between its formulae and the infinite variety of appearances? The 
technosciences in general, and synthetic biology in particular begin in the middle of things, they are 
right there and on friendly terms (“Hello World”) with the world that they squarely inhabit as an 
extended laboratory which is overflowing with phenomena of their own making (compare 
Bensaude-Vincent and Simon 2008). These technosciences build on the achievements of science 
and technology to further enlarge technological and predictive control. Instead of presenting the 
external world to the human mind, they amalgamate the workings of the human mind with the 
workings of machinery and the workings of black-boxed biological nature in order to create highly 
complex, yet reasonably robust structures or processes.  
 This, then, suggests a definition of synthetic biology that highlights its specific epistemic values     
and ideals: For constructive purposes synthetic biology builds on the achievement in silico, in vitro, 
and in vivo of technical control of biological complexity, that is, it is the endeavor of drawing 
together de facto achievements of technical control for the generation of technical systems with 
greater biological complexity.   29
CONCLUSION 
The philosophy of synthetic biology seeks to characterize an emerging, indeed contested field of 
inquiry. In this survey, it therefore began by showing that different epistemic communities might 
attach different meanings or interpretations to central concepts such as “understanding,” “rational 
engineering,” “evolution,” and “design.” It was then shown that these different interpretations give 
 Also, this perspective affords a way of distinguishing the simulation approach in synthetic biology from that in 28
systems biology, and thus a way of re-interpreting the examples discussed in Gramelsberger 2013, compare notes 18 
and 19 above.
 To be sure, „de facto achievements of technical control of biological complexity“ does not require an understanding 29
of biological complexity, it refers only to the local and partial success stories where some biological process can be 
manipulated or replicated (in a biological system or in a simulation model).  
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rise to different stories of how systems biology led to synthetic biology where each of these stories 
expresses different epistemic values and ideals. But from the tension between scientific and 
technoscientific epistemic commitments it was still possible to finally distill a definition of 
synthetic biology. That this was possible is due to the fact that the tension between an engineering 
approach and the quest for understanding biological processes cannot be resolved in any old way. 
And pointing this out is a valuable philosophical contribution to synthetic biology at this early stage 
in its development.  
 It is quite impossible to simply marry the epistemic ideals of technoscientific synthetic biology     
to those of biology as a theoretical science – they pull in opposite directions, after all: Here the 
reduction of complexity for the purposes of intellectual tractability, there the drawing together of 
scientific knowledge and technological capability for the generation of complexity beyond our 
ability to truly understand how our own creations work. Here the identification of bottle-necks and 
needs-to-know for rational engineering, along with the demand for more and better theoretical 
knowledge in order to diminish ignorance, and there the attempt primarily to discover how much 
one can achieve even with how little we know, with considerable tolerance for ignorance of 
everything that can be black-boxed. The tension, even antagonism, between these epistemic ideals 
cannot be dissolved – which does not preclude, of course, that the corresponding research findings 
can inform, even inspire one another.   
 It is not at all impossible, in contrast, to marry the notion of bringing an engineering approach to     
biology and the notion of knowledge production through synthetic biology – but in order to do so 
one might have to become dishabituated from the established scientific image of knowledge and of 
knowledge production. From the point of view of the engineering approach, knowledge and 
understanding need not be tied to the intellectual tractability of causal relations, nor does it consist 
in the truth or falsity, or empirical adequacy of linguistic statements such as theories or hypotheses. 
Instead, knowledge and understanding might reside in computer models and other technologically 
robust constructions, tied to the iterations of the design cycle as a learning process of sorts. 
 This allows us finally to appreciate the last sentences of the Nature editorial that appeared on the     
occasion of Roberta Kwok’s analysis, and the tenth anniversary of synthetic biology:   
As it develops along this and other paths, synthetic biology itself will demand more by way of new 
fundamental biological knowledge — quantitative, systematic, computational and biophysical. And 
conversely, one of the deepest lessons from these first ten years is that biological knowledge will 
require synthetic approaches if it is to become a mature and reasonably predictive science. (Nature 
editorial 2010) 
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 There is little to disagree with in these concluding remarks. To the extent that they gloss over the     
antagonism between epistemic ideals, these two sentences require only a bit of rephrasing and 
clarification: Of course, synthetic biology can only benefit from new fundamental biological 
knowledge – this is an argument for a pluralism of approaches, scientific and technoscientific, 
within biology. By the same token, synthetic biology will continue in its search for design solutions 
that do not depend on the availability of new fundamental biological knowledge. And as for the 
“deepest lesson” offered by synthetic biology, it leads to the question of how the very notion of 
“biological knowledge” will be transformed through the synthetic approach. This includes the 
question, for example, of the difference between predicting on the basis of explanatory theories, and 
predicting on the grounds of technological robustness. With this deepest lesson there is much to do 
for the philosophy of synthetic biology.  30
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